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Capitalization of R&D and the Informativeness of Stock Prices 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents both a new approach to studying the consequences of accounting choice and 
a unique sample to examine the effects of accounting choice in the R&D context. We investigate 
the effect of firms’ decision to capitalize R&D expenditures on the amount of information about 
future earnings reflected in current stock returns, as captured by the association between current-
year returns and future earnings (FERC). We use a sample of U.K. firms, which includes both 
R&D capitalizers and expensers. An important feature of our tests is our use of a two equation 
system to control for the endogeneity of the accounting choice (i.e., self selection). Proponents of 
capitalization claim that it enables management to better communicate information about the 
success of projects and their probable future benefits. Consistent with this, we find that 
capitalization is associated with higher FERC than expensing. 
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I. Introduction 
 In this paper, we present both a new approach to studying the consequences of 
accounting choice, and we use a unique sample to examine the effects of accounting choice in 
the R&D context. We examine whether capitalization of R&D expenditures is associated with 
more informative stock prices, relative to expensing R&D. We define stock price 
informativeness as the amount of information about future earnings that is reflected in current 
period stock returns, as captured by the association between current-year returns and future 
earnings. We use a sample that includes both R&D capitalizers and expensers. Almost all other 
R&D studies (with the primary exceptions of and Green, Stark and Thomas (1996) and Aboody 
and Lev (1998)) only include expensers. Our investigation is important, because as Fields, Lys, 
and Vincent (2001) discuss in their review of the accounting choice literature during the 1990's, 
the consequences of accounting choice are largely unknown.  
The R&D accounting choice is an important choice to study, because there has been 
much debate about the pros and cons of capitalization (Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Lev and 
Zarowin (1999), Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002)). Moreover, for firms that engage in R&D 
activities, R&D expenditures are likely to have a material impact on their earnings and stock 
returns. So, if there are stock price effects associated with the capitalize vs expense choice, these 
effects may be statistically detectable.  
 We use a sample of U.K. firms that engaged in R&D activities during the 1990s. While 
R&D capitalization is not allowed in the U.S. (except in the case of the software industry - SFAS 
#86), it is an available alternative in the U.K.1 Having capitalizers in our sample is critical, 
because R&D studies on U.S. firms, such as Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Monahan (2005), Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001), Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002), Healy, Myers, 
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and Howe (2002), and Lev, Nissim, and Thomas (2002) must hypothesize the unobservable 
effects of capitalization on R&D expensers, but we can actually observe and test hypotheses 
about the consequences of capitalization. Since the U.K. capital market is a well developed, 
liquid market that is similar to the U.S. (as well as to the stock markets of other developed 
nations), our results might be generalized to other countries.2 
 We measure informativeness as the coefficient on future earnings in a regression of 
current stock return against current and future earnings. We refer to this as the future earnings 
response coefficient, FERC. Ceteris paribus, firms whose stock returns reflect more information 
about future earnings have higher stock price informativeness, and thus higher FERC. Our tests 
are based on those in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002), who relate 
measures of voluntary corporate disclosure to the FERC. In their case, the disclosure metric was 
based on analysts’ rankings. In our case, the disclosure metric is based on the R&D accounting 
method.  
 The relation between R&D capitalization and stock price informativeness is important for 
both academics and policymakers, because it addresses the fundamental issues of whether and 
how accounting matters. In the U.S., there has recently been much debate about the potential 
benefits of R&D capitalization. For example, Lev and Zarowin (1999) argue that capitalization 
enables better matching of R&D costs and benefits, thus providing more information for 
financial statement users, and Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002) show that successful efforts 
capitalization can provide information benefits relative to immediate expensing. The central 
point is that capitalization, by providing information about the percentage of outlays capitalized 
vs expensed and about the period of amortization, enables management to communicate 
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information about the success of projects and their probable future benefits. This information is 
not recognized under expensing; thus, capitalization can lead to more informative stock prices.  
 For example, Hughes and Kao (1991) argue that capitalization is more informative than 
expensing, because it requires estimates of future benefits and auditor verification of such 
estimates, and Vigeland (1981) argues that the switch to full expensing of R&D in the U.S. under 
SFAS # 2 reduced the amount of information available, since it is difficult for the market to 
estimate the unobserved capitalized benefits. Lev and Sougiannis’ (1996) and Chan, Lakonishok, 
and Sougiannis’ (2001) findings of excess returns to R&D intensive firms in the U.S. is 
consistent with this view, because the lack of capitalization makes it difficult to evaluate these 
firms, thus leading to market inefficiencies.  
On the other hand, capitalization might not result in more informative (efficient) prices 
for at least three reasons. First, the market may doubt management’s information, based on the 
belief that management is manipulating earnings for its own benefit, such as in the case of an 
earnings-based bonus plan. Since the success of R&D activities is so difficult to measure and 
forecast, the auditing system does not necessarily alleviate such concerns. Second, even if 
management is honest, and this can be attested, the high uncertainty of R&D activities may 
render the ex-ante information made available by capitalization relatively worthless, since this 
information relies on estimates based on future projections. In this view, even the best forecast is 
a poor one. Third, even if management is honest and R&D capitalization information is reliable, 
expensers can simply disclose the information, as an alternative to balance sheet recognition 
(although such disclosure is not costless, since it might reveal proprietary information). Thus, 
whether or not capitalization provides information benefits to the market, resulting in more 
informative prices, is ultimately an empirical question, which this paper seeks to answer. If R&D 
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capitalization makes stock prices more informative, capitalizing firms should have higher FERC, 
ceteris paribus. 
 A fundamental issue for any test of the effects of accounting choice is self-selection 
(endogeneity of the choice: Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Skinner, 1993). This is especially 
important here, because the decision to capitalize vs expense R&D is endogenous and is 
associated with factors that affect the relation between current returns and future earnings. In 
particular, capitalizers are “early life cycle” firms, while expensers are more “mature” firms, and 
more mature firms have a stronger returns-earnings relation. Thus, a crucial feature of our tests is 
that we use a two equation system to control for the endogeneity of the accounting choice.  
Using a sample of firms from the U.K.’s three largest R&D industries (based on number 
of firms with R&D outlays) during the 1990’s, we regress current returns against current and 
future earnings for R&D capitalizers and expensers (with capitalizers’ earnings re-stated to be on 
an as-if expense basis, so the earnings of the two groups are comparable), and we compare the 
coefficients on the future earnings. We find that capitalization is associated with higher FERC 
than expensing. While we remain cautious in drawing strong inferences or policy implications 
given the short time period and small number of industries, our results suggest that capitalization 
is more informative than expensing, as capitalization’s proponents have suggested. Thus, we 
provide the first empirical evidence that an accounting choice may affect the amount of 
information about future earnings reflected in stock returns. In summary, we contribute both a 
new approach to studying the effects of accounting choice and a unique sample to test the effects 
of accounting choice in the R&D context.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on 
accounting choice and R&D capitalization. Section 3 discusses our measure of stock price 
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informativeness and the test methodology. Section 4 discusses the data and sample. Section 5 
reports the results of the empirical tests. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Relation to Prior Research 
 Our study is at the intersection of two research streams: research on the consequences of 
accounting choice and research on the value relevance of R&D capitalization. As summarized by 
Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001), research on the consequences of accounting choice has focused 
on the stock market’s reaction to a given choice, as evidenced by abnormal returns around the 
time of the decision. The maintained hypothesis, based on market efficiency, is that if the choice 
does not have an effect on cash flows, there should be no abnormal stock returns. In general, this 
is what has been found. Motivated by Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978, 1986) positive accounting 
theory, studies also focused on examining stock price effects related to debt covenants, incentive 
compensation, or political costs. In general, the issues were never really resolved, and the 
economic consequences of accounting choices are mostly unknown. 
 Our tests contrast with those based on the abnormal returns methodology, and our 
approach has a number of advantages over calculating abnormal returns. First, since we examine 
relative informativeness, our tests do not imply, require, or test that stock prices are (semi-strong 
form) efficient. Because of the Fama (1970) joint test problem, tests based on abnormal returns 
can never be sure whether they are really finding excess returns or mis-measured risk. 
More important, in many contexts it is not clear over what period to calculate excess 
returns, or in which firms to take long vs short positions (i.e., which firms are over- or under-
valued), which is necessary to calculate portfolio abnormal returns. These are central problems in 
testing whether a particular accounting policy, disclosure choice, or accounting method is 
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superior to an alternative policy, choice, or method. The informativeness methodology avoids 
these problems by examining how much current returns reflect future information, rather than 
whether future returns can be earned based on current information.                
Finally, tests of abnormal returns focus on private benefits, whereas tests of 
informativeness focus on social benefits. Whether or not private benefits can be earned, it is 
important to know whether the market as a whole is better off. If accounting choices in general, 
and the R&D capitalization vs expense choice in particular, cause more (less) information to be 
impounded into stock prices, they likely improve (aggravate) resource allocation.3 
 The value-relevance of recognized intangibles has been examined by Green, Stark, and 
Thomas (1996), Ely and Waymire (1999), and Barth and Clinch (1998). Green, Stark, and 
Thomas study U.K. firms in the 1990's, Ely and Waymire study U.S. firms in the pre-SEC era 
(when capitalization of internally developed intangibles was allowed),and Barth and Clinch 
study Australian firms that revalue their intangible assets. These authors’ findings generally 
support the claim that recognized intangibles assets are valued by the market. However, these 
papers do not compare the effects of capitalization vs expensing. 
 Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Monahan (2005), Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001), 
Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson (2002), Healy, Myers, and Howe (2002), and Lev, Nissim, 
and Thomas (2002) examine the value relevance of capitalized R&D for U.S. firms, and 
universally find that the stock market treats R&D as an asset. However, these papers must 
hypothesize the unobservable effects of capitalization on R&D expensers, since R&D 
capitalization is not allowed in the U.S. Thus, by definition, they cannot compare the effects of 
capitalization vs. expensing. 
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 Perhaps the closest papers to ours are Loudder and Behn (1995) and Aboody and Lev 
(1998). Loudder and Behn compare the earnings usefulness of U.S. firms that capitalized vs 
expensed R&D before SFAS #2, and the change in earnings usefulness for firms that were forced 
to switch from capitalization to expensing. They define usefulness by the contemporaneous 
price-earnings relation. The contemporaneous relation, however, does not directly address the 
issue of whether capitalization makes prices more informative (efficient) by revealing 
information about the firm’s future prospects. Aboody and Lev compare U.S. firms that 
capitalize vs expense software R&D outlays under SFAS #86. They find that the balance sheet 
(book) value of capitalized software R&D predicts future earnings. However, this finding does 
not imply that the stock prices of capitalizers’ are more informative (efficient): since expensers 
can disclose the unrecognized information, it could be reflected in their prices even though their 
R&D book value is zero.4 Thus, since price or return is not one of Aboody and Lev’s forecasting 
variables, they do not address the issue of how much information about future earnings is 
reflected in prices. Most important, no other papers examine the consequences of accounting 
choice by focusing on the relation between current prices and future information (earnings).  
 Our paper is in the spirit of Fields, Lys, and Vincent’s (2001) call for research assessing 
the economic implications of accounting choice in relation to the market imperfections that drive 
such choices. As they discuss, one key market imperfection is the information asymmetry 
between manager-insiders and shareholder-outsiders. In this context, accounting choice is one 
way in which managers convey their private information to shareholders, which makes prices 
more informative.  “Accounting choice may provide a mechanism by which better informed 
insiders can impart information to less well-informed parties about the timing, magnitude, and 
risk of future cash flows”. (Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001: 262)5 
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 Ours is the first study to examine the consequences of accounting choice in terms of its 
affects on stock price informativeness. Thus, this paper presents a new approach to studying the 
effects of accounting choice. 
 
3. Measure of Stock Price Informativeness  
Our stock price informativeness measure (how much information about future earnings is 
capitalized into price) is based on Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (CKSS, 1994). CKSS 
assume revisions in expected dividends to be correlated with revisions in expected earnings, 
which allows them to express current stock returns as a function of the current period’s 
unexpected earnings and (discounted) changes in expected future earnings. Of course, the 
expectations imbedded in the returns are unobservable. The goal of this paper is to see whether 
the market’s future earnings expectations, as implied in stock returns, are closer to future 
earnings realizations for firms that capitalize R&D costs; i.e., whether capitalization results in 
current returns that are more highly associated with future earnings. CKSS proxy for current 
unexpected earnings using observed current change in earnings, and for changes in expected 
future earnings using changes in reported future earnings. This results in a regression of current 
annual stock returns, Rt on current and future annual earnings changes (firm subscripts omitted):6 
                 Rt = a + b0ΔEt + b1ΔEt+1 + ut             (1) 
where the earnings variables are in per share form and are scaled by the share price at the 
beginning of the current year (to avoid having to delete firms with negative or zero beginning-of-
period earnings), and the stock returns are total annual stock returns, defined as capital gain plus 
dividend yield (measured over the period from nine months prior to fiscal year end to three 
months after fiscal year end). 
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 Using earnings changes as explanatory variables assumes that earnings follow a random 
walk. Rather than impose this condition, we follow Lundholm and Myers (2002) and estimate 
the levels form of the regression: 
                          Rt = a + b0Et-1 + b1Et + b2Et+1 + ut             (2) 
 As Lundholm and Myers note, (2) allows the random walk as a special case, if b0 = -b1: 
the more mean reverting earnings are, the smaller (in absolute value) is b0 relative to b1. In (2), b2 
is the future earnings response coefficient, FERC, and is hypothesized to be positive; b1, often 
referred to as the contemporaneous ERC, is also hypothesized to be positive, and b0 is 
hypothesized to be negative.7 
  In order to make the regression results comparable for capitalizers and expensers, we 
adjust capitalizers’ earnings to be on a “pro-forma” expense basis. We construct capitalizers’ 
pro-forma earnings by subtracting the excess (or adding the deficit) after-tax amount of 
development costs capitalized minus amortization expense, from reported net income. 
 CKSS argue that using the actual future earnings introduces an error in variables bias in 
estimates of the future earnings coefficients, since the theoretically correct regressor is the 
unobservable expected future earnings. To help mitigate the errors in variables bias, we follow 
CKSS and include the future return as a control variable and estimate the model: 
   Rt = a + b0Et-1 + b1Et + b2Et+1 + b3Rt+1 + ut              (3)  
The hypothesized coefficient on Rt+1 is negative. Based on CKSS’s evidence that the relation 
between current returns and future earnings is statistically insignificant beyond three years, we 
follow them and use a three year future earnings horizon. Based on Lundholm and Myers, we 
aggregate all three years into one future variable, for ease of exposition. Lundholm and Myers 
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show that their results are unchanged whether the three future years are entered separately or 
aggregated.  
Our goal is to compare the future earnings response coefficient, between capitalizers and 
expensers. The null hypothesis is that FERC is equal for both groups. If capitalizers’ FERC is 
greater than expensers’ FERC, then capitalization of R&D is associated with more informative 
stock prices. Our tests are based on those in Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers 
(2002), who show that increased voluntary disclosure results in higher FERC, implying that the 
disclosure reveals information that results in returns impounding more information about future 
earnings. In their case, the disclosure metric was based on analysts’ rankings. In our case, the 
disclosure metric is based on the R&D accounting choice.8 
We compare FERC for capitalizers vs expensers separately for each industry in our 
sample. Estimation by industry is important, because R&D activities are industry specific; thus 
R&D intensive firms are likely to be homogeneous within an industry and heterogeneous across 
industries. Conducting tests on similar firms in an industry decreases the probability of omitted 
correlated variables driving the results. Indeed, literally by definition, firms in a given industry 
are buffeted by the same economic shocks, have similar production and sales cycles, and tend to 
use similar accounting methods. By conducting an intra-industry analysis, we can control for 
these economic and accounting factors (without having to use potentially noisy proxy variables), 
and thereby focus on the effect on FERC of differences in information between capitalization 
and expensing.  
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4. Data and Sample    
We examine U.K. firms because U.K. GAAP permits, but does not require, the 
capitalization and subsequent amortization of development expenditures if five conditions are 
met: (1) There is a clearly defined project; (2) The related expenditure is separately identifiable; 
(3) The outcome of the project is examined for its technical feasibility and its ultimate 
commercial viability considered in light of factors such as likely market conditions (including 
competing products), public opinion, and consumer and environmental legislation; (4) The 
aggregate of deferred development costs, any further development costs, and related production, 
selling and administrative costs is reasonably expected to be exceeded by related future sales or 
other revenues; and (5) Adequate resources exist, or are reasonably expected to be available, to 
enable the project to be completed and to provide any consequential increases in working capital 
[Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) No. 13, 1989]. Any expenditures on  
research (pure or applied) must be expensed in the period incurred. In summary, the five 
conditions are intended to ensure that an asset is indeed created by the R&D expenditures. 9 
Our initial sample includes all U.K. firms on Datastream (active and dead files) that 
disclosed either a R&D asset (item #342) or R&D expense (item #119) in any year t = 1990 - 
1999. We begin in 1990 because prior to the revised SSAP No. 13 in 1989 many firms did not 
voluntarily report their R&D expenditure (the revised SSAP No. 13 made this disclosure 
mandatory). This search yields 4,566 firm-year observations (840 firms). For observations with a 
positive value of R&D asset, we examine the firm's notes to the financial statements to ensure 
that the amount recorded by Datastream in fact relates to an R&D asset.10 We also require data 
on industry membership, earnings, number of shares outstanding and corporate tax rate (lagged, 
contemporaneous and the subsequent three years), stock price and stock return 
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(contemporaneous annual return and the subsequent three-year buy-and-hold return) to be 
available on Datastream. Removal of inappropriate observations and observations with missing 
data reduces the sample to 3,091 firm-year observations (520 firms). We classify each firm-year 
observation as a capitalizer in that year if the firm reported either a non-zero value for the R&D 
asset or a non-zero amount for R&D amortization; otherwise the firm-year observation is 
classified as an expenser. Since we perform our analysis by industry, we use the top three R&D 
industries (defined by number of firm-year observations) in order to have enough observations to 
estimate our informativeness regression. This gives us a sample of 1,098 firm-year observations 
(205 firms). Finally, in later tests we require our firms to have lagged values of R&D 
expenditures, therefore we remove observations in 1990. This gives us our final sample of 1,002 
firm-year observations (201 firms), ranging from 112 firms in 1991, to a high number of 115 
firms in 1994, 1995 and 1998, and ending with 108 firms in 1999.   
Table 1, Panel A reports the number of firm-year observations by industry. We use 
Datastream Level 4 industry classifications, in order to have the finest industry classification 
possible to ensure maximum homogeneity of the observations in any given industry. The large 
number of expensers relative to capitalizers suggests either that development expenditures rarely 
meet the five conditions necessary for capitalization or that, when the conditions are met, 
managers are reluctant to capitalize development costs. In our tests below, we empirically model 
the capitalization vs expensing choice. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2, Panel A reports descriptive statistics on many firm characteristics for our sample 
observations. Expensers tend to be larger than capitalizers (indicated by a significantly larger 
median market value and book value of equity). Expensers and capitalizers have similar average 
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earnings, with expensers having a significantly higher median earnings as compared to 
capitalizers. For the current and sum of the future three years reported EPS (Reported EPSt and 
Reported EPSt+τ, respectively), expensers are significantly (at conventional levels) more 
profitable. However, there is no significant difference between the average lagged reported EPS 
between expensers and capitalizers.   
Expensers have a larger median share price than capitalizers (£1.25 versus £1.04, 
respectively). Capitalizers are riskier than expensers, with significantly greater earnings 
variability measured as σ2(EPSt/Pt-1) (calculated over the period 1990 - 2002), and the median 
capitalizer is significantly more levered. Additionally, expensers are significantly older than 
capitalizers, with an average age of 38.9 years versus 32.1 years, respectively (age is defined as 
the number of years since incorporation). The average market-to-book ratio is significantly 
higher for capitalizers (although the median market-to-book ratios are not significantly different). 
Capitalizers also have a significantly larger R&D intensity. However, the two groups are not 
significantly different in terms of their betas.11 
Table 2, Panel B shows that the mean and median contemporaneous returns for expensers 
are 33.5% and 15.8%, while for capitalizers they are 25.4% and 6.7%. While there is no 
statistical (at conventional levels) difference in the means, there is in the medians. Both Basu 
(1997) with U.S. data and Pope and Walker (1999) with U.K. data show that due to the 
conservatism principle, timeliness is related to good vs bad news, as measured by the sign of the 
contemporaneous stock return. Since delayed recognition of good news enhances the relation 
between current returns and future earnings, the higher median return for expensers works 
against our finding a higher FERC for capitalizers. 
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Finally, this table shows that the pro-forma earnings per share (which are used in the 
informativeness tests) are slightly lower than the reported earnings per share for the capitalizers. 
This indicates that the policy of capitalization generally increases reported earnings.12   
Overall, Table 2 shows that capitalizers are younger, smaller, riskier, and less profitable 
than expensers, characteristics typical of “early life cycle” firms. This is consistent with Skinner 
(1993), who finds that larger firms tend to use income decreasing accounting methods, and with   
Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis (1999), and Beaver and Ryan (2000), who show that for early life 
cycle firms, measured profitability is higher under capitalization, which might explain their 
capitalization decision.  
Insert Table 2 here 
These group differences are important for our tests, because they indicate that the choice 
to capitalize or expense is endogenous, and is associated with firm characteristics that affect 
FERC. In addition to informativeness, the primary determinants of the relation between current 
returns and future earnings are earnings timeliness and forecastability (variability). Earnings that 
are less timely have a weaker relation with contemporaneous returns, but a stronger relation with 
lagged returns, because price impounds information instantaneously, but the accounting system 
recognizes it with a lag. Earnings that are more variable (uncertain, difficult to forecast) have a 
weaker relation with (lagged) returns, because price reflects the market’s forecast.   
Timeliness and forecastability are related to size, profitability, and earnings variability. 
Smaller firms have a poorer information environment than larger firms, poor profitability is 
associated with lower earnings persistence, and more variable earnings are less persistent, riskier 
and harder to forecast.13 
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In summary, capitalizers’ characteristics imply that they should have a lower FERC than 
expensers, absent any information advantage due to capitalization. In order to isolate the effect of 
capitalization on FERC, we must control for the endogeneity of the capitalization vs expensing 
decision. 
 
5. Empirical Tests and Results 
5.1 Explaining the Capitalize vs Expense Choice 
As pointed out above, a crucial issue for any test of the effects of accounting choice is 
self selection (endogeneity of the accounting choice). In our case, the issue is that firms self 
select as expensers vs capitalizers based on factors that are associated with the relation between 
current returns and future earnings, and we must control for these factors (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990; Skinner, 1993). In particular, Section 4 discussed evidence that capitalizers 
are earlier life cycle firms than expensers, and that less mature firms have a weaker returns-
earnings relation than more mature firms.  Because of this endogeneity, we cannot simply 
estimate the returns regression (3) for each group.  
To control for the endogeneity, we use the method used by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
when the group dummy variable (CAP in our case) is endogeneous and is used interactively in 
the regression, as we do. The model is estimated using the two-stage approach of Heckman 
(1979) and Lee (1979). In the first stage, the capitalization choice equation is estimated as a 
Probit model and, using the parameters from this model, the inverse Mills ratio is computed for 
all firms. In the second stage, the returns regression is estimated, including the inverse Mills ratio 
as a control, and allowing its coefficient to vary between the two groups.14 
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Our Probit model explains the capitalization vs expense decision as a function of a firm’s 
life cycle stage, and whether the firm meets the five conditions for capitalization (i.e., whether 
the firm is able to capitalize). As pointed out above, relating the accounting choice to the firm’s 
life cycle is consistent with Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis (1999), and Beaver and Ryan (2000), 
who show that the effects of capitalization on measured profitability is related to the firm’s life 
cycle stage. As empirical proxies to capture life cycle, we use six explanatory variables: earnings 
variability (a measure of risk and persistence), profitability, firm size (market value of equity), 
the market-to-book ratio (a measure of risk and growth), R&D intensity, and Beta.15          
Earnings variability (EARN_VAR) is calculated as σ2(EPSt/Pt-1) using all available data from 
1990-2002 (we require a minimum of three observations per firm to estimate variability).16  
Like Lundholm and Myers, we proxy for earnings profitability using a dummy variable 
(EARN_SIGN) that equals ‘one’ if contemporaneous earnings are positive and ‘zero’ otherwise.  
Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the market value of equity. Market-to-Book (M/B) is market 
value divided by book value (converted to an 'as-if-expense' basis for the capitalizers). R&D 
intensity (RDINT) is total R&D expenditures divided by total assets (converted to an 'as-if-
expense' basis for the capitalizers). Beta (BETA) is the market model beta calculated using 
monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 
months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index.  
While there are many potential proxies, we use these because it is well known that they 
are related to timeliness and forecastability, which determine FERC. For example, Lundholm 
and Myers (2002) control for risk, growth, persistence, profitability, and size in their study of 
disclosure and FERC. R&D intensity relates to timeliness and forecastability, because greater 
R&D intensity is associated with more variable earnings (Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002)) 
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and with higher growth. We control for Beta, as a proxy for the firm’s discount rate, because the 
coefficient on earnings is related to the rate at which earnings are discounted (Collins and 
Kothari, 1989).17      
As an empirical proxy to capture whether a firm meets the 5 capitalization conditions, we  
 
use the ratio:  
 
RD_VALUE =      MV – BV               
               R&D Expenditure  
 
The numerator is the difference between the firm’s market value of equity and its book value of 
equity at the end of the firm’s fiscal year, an estimate of the unrecognized economic asset created 
by the R&D expenditures (capitalizers’ BV is adjusted to BV under expensing). The 
denominator is the sum of the firm’s current and lagged annual R&D expenditures.18   
By definition, all capitalizers meet the 5 conditions. Although we cannot observe whether 
expensers meet the five capitalization conditions, firms that are forced to expense (mandatory 
expensers) are less successful in their R&D endeavors than capitalizers or optional expensers; 
i.e., mandatory expensers’ payoffs from their R&D expenditures are less certain than those of the 
capitalizers or optional expensers, so it is questionable whether an asset is created by the R&D 
expenditures. RD_VALUE exploits the links between R&D uncertainty, expected R&D success, 
and the ability to capitalize. By definition, since more successful R&D firms create greater 
economic assets per pound sterling of R&D expenditure, more successful firms have a higher 
value of the ratio. Mandatory expensers’ greater uncertainty of their R&D payoffs causes the 
market to discount their expected future cash flows at a higher rate, resulting in lower 
RD_VALUEs than optional expensers or capitalizers.  
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We conducted numerous tests to confirm the efficacy of RD_VALUE as a measure of 
R&D success (and thus as a filter for mandatory expensers). As reported in Table 3, we find that 
RD_VALUE is significantly positively rank correlated both with return on equity (both raw ROE 
and with capitalizers adjusted to be on an 'as-if-expense' basis) and with revenue growth for all 
of our industries. We also find that in the large majority of years for each industry in our sample 
(89%, 89%, and 56% for Electronics, Engineering, and Software, respectively), expensers have 
the lowest values of the ratio (results not reported). This is exactly what we expect if 
RD_VALUE is a measure of success, and the least successful firms are required to expense.19 
Based on this evidence, we believe that RD_VALUE is an appropriate proxy for R&D success, 
and for whether a firm meets the 5 capitalization conditions.  
Insert Table 3 here 
Thus, our Probit model is: 20 
CAPit = β0 + β1EARN_VARit + β2EARN_SIGNit + β3SIZEit + β4M/Bit        (4) 
 + β5RDINTit + β6BETAit + β7RD_VALUEit + εit 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of our Probit models on our full sample. We 
estimate separate models for each industry, because the nature of R&D activities is industry 
specific. To avoid overfitting, we emphasize parsimony and use the above seven explanatory 
variables for each industry, rather than empirically search for the “best” industry model. 
Consistent with the life cycle story, firms more likely to capitalize have more variable earnings 
(the signs on EARN_VAR is significantly positive in two industries). The coefficient on 
RD_VALUE is significantly negative for Electrical firms. The negative coefficient on 
RD_VALUE indicates that in this industry, the most successful firms choose to expense. In the 
other two industries, RD_VALUE is of mixed sign and is not significant. In Section 5.3, below, 
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we discuss further the Probit results for RD_VALUE. The results for the other five factors are 
mixed. The Probit model classifies approximately 70% of the firm-year observations correctly  
(ranging from 67.6% in Engineering to 72.3% in Electrical).21 
Insert Table 4 here 
5.2 Returns Regression 
The second stage returns regression includes the inverse Mills ratio as a control, allowing 
its coefficient to vary between the two groups:  
Rt = α0 + Φ1Et-1 + Φ2Et + Φ3Et+τ + Φ4Rt+τ + Φ5CAPt + Φ6CAPt*Et-1 + Φ7CAPt*Et  + 
Φ8CAPt*Et+τ + Φ9CAPt*Rt+τ  + Φ10MILLSt + Φ11MILLSt*CAPt + μt (5)  
 
where CAPt is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is classified as a capitalizer in year t, 
zero otherwise. The estimated coefficient on CAPt*Et+τ (Φ8) represents the incremental stock 
price informativeness for capitalizers relative to expensers.22 
Results of estimating equation (5) on our full sample are reported in column 1 of Table 5, 
which reports mean coefficients across the industries, and the Z statistic (Barth, 1994) for testing 
whether the mean coefficient is significantly different from zero.23 
The average ERC (Φ2) and FERC (Φ3) are significantly positive, and the average 
coefficients on lagged earnings (Φ1) and future returns (Φ4) are significantly negative, as 
expected. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio multiplied by the capitalization dummy is 
significant, supporting the importance of the endogeneity control. Most important, the mean 
incremental FERC is positive (Φ8 =0.25) and statistically significant (Z=2.05).  
Insert Table 5 here 
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This result shows that capitalization is associated with more informative stock prices than 
expensing. This is the first empirical evidence that an accounting method choice is associated 
with the amount of information about future fundamentals reflected in current stock returns. 
 
5.3 Robustness Tests – Excluding Mandatory Expensers 
As a robustness test, we delete mandatory expensers from our sample, and we re-estimate 
our two-equation system on capitalizers and optional expensers. Based on our evidence that 
RD_VALUE is a measure of success, we define mandatory expensers as those with either a 
negative RD_VALUE (from MV < BV) or an RD_VALUE lower than the lowest capitalizer for 
each industry-year. This ensures that all remaining expensers were at least as successful in their 
R&D endeavors as the least successful capitalizer, and so these remaining expensers likely have 
met the five capitalization conditions. Table 1, Panel B shows the industry breakdown of the 
optional expensers. In total, this filter deleted 245 of the original 834 expensers (29%).  
Since all firms in the reduced sample are able to capitalize, this test is more of an “apples 
to apples” comparison than our previous test. In other words, by eliminating mandatory 
expensers, we can test whether actually capitalizing provides more information about future 
earnings (higher FERC) than just meeting the five conditions or footnote disclosure.   
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of our Probit models on our reduced sample. Note 
that the coefficient of RD_VALUE is now negative in all three industries and significant in two 
(marginally significant in the third), whereas in the full sample, the coefficient of RD_VALUE 
was only significantly negative in one industry and was positive in another. Note also that the 
percentage of observations correctly classified has increased in all three industries. These two 
results are likely related. 
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Recall that a negative coefficient on RD_VALUE means that the most successful firms 
choose to expense. In the full sample, mandatory expensers (those with the lowest 
RD_VALUEs) are included, reducing the average RD_VALUE of expensers, and making it 
comparable to (or even lower than) capitalizers’ average RD_VALUE. Thus, in this sample, 
RD_VALUE does not discriminate between capitalizers and expensers. In the reduced sample, 
only expensers with high RD_VALUEs remain, and expensers have significantly higher 
RD_VALUEs than capitalizers, as shown by the Probit results; i.e., in this sample, RD_VALUE 
does discriminate between capitalizers and expensers. Thus, expensers are a mix of the most 
unsuccessful R&D firms (mandatory expensers) and the most successful R&D firms (voluntary 
expensers). The improvement of the Probit models in Panel B is due to the discriminatory power 
of RD_VALUE as a measure of success when mandatory expensers are removed, because the 
most successful firms choose to expense. In the full sample, the discriminatory power of 
RD_VALUE was diminished by the inclusion of the mandatory expensers.  
Column 2 of Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation (5) on the reduced 
sample.24 Note that the average ERC (Φ2) and FERC (Φ3) are higher than in the full sample 
(1.84 vs 1.10 and 0.39 vs 0.35, respectively), consistent with our deletion of less successful 
firms, and thus providing additional support for RD_VALUE as a measure of R&D success. 
Likewise, the mean incremental FERC is lower than in the full sample (0.18 vs 0.25), since this
incremental effect now only captures the information benefit of capitalization, not the differen
between successful vs unsuccessful firms (i.e., the reduction in FERC in the reduced sample 
shows that some of the incremental benefit in the full sample was due to the inclusion of 
unsuccessful expensers), but the incremental FERC is still marginally significantly positive at t
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.05 level, supporting the inference that capitalization is associated with more informative stoc
prices relative to expen
 
6. Conclusion 
 We have examined whether capitalization of R&D expenditures is associated with more 
informative stock prices, relative to expensing R&D, where stock price informativeness is 
defined as the amount of information about future earnings that is reflected in current period 
stock returns. We measure informativeness as the coefficient on future earnings in a regression 
of current stock return against current and future earnings, which we refer to as the future 
earnings response coefficient, FERC. Ceteris paribus, firms whose stock returns reflect more 
information about future earnings have higher stock price informativeness, and higher FERC. 
 An important feature of our tests is control for self-selection, because the decision to 
capitalize vs expense R&D is endogenous and is associated with factors that affect the relation 
between current returns and future earnings. In particular, capitalizers are “early life cycle” 
firms, while expensers are more “mature” firms, and more mature firms have a stronger returns-
earnings relation.  
We find that capitalization is associated with greater stock price informativeness (higher 
FERC). Thus, our results provide the first empirical evidence consistent with the proposition that 
capitalization of R&D provides more information (about future earnings) to the market, as 
capitalization’s proponents have suggested.  
Our results are subject to a number of important caveats. First, our tests are based on 
three industries over one decade. Also, due to the length of our sample, we are limited to a three 
year horizon, which does not capture all of the benefits of R&D that require a longer gestation 
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period. Moreover, in our reduced sample, the incremental FERC due to capitalization is only 
marginally significant at conventional levels. Finally, since our capitalization prediction model is 
imperfect, we may not have captured all existing predictability. In this case, our evidence of a 
higher FERC for capitalizers might be due to an unmodeled group difference, rather than to 
greater informativeness. For these reasons, we remain cautious in drawing strong inferences or 
policy implications from our evidence.  
Perhaps more important than our results, however, we contribute both a new approach to 
studying the effects of accounting choice and a unique sample to test the effects of accounting 
choice in the R&D context. Application of our approach to other accounting choices and 
examination of the effects of R&D capitalization using both R&D expensers and capitalizers 
represent promising avenues for future research. 
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 Table 1 
Sample Observations 
 
Panel A: Full Samplea
 
Industry Name  Expensers  Capitalizers 
     
Electronic and Electrical Equipment  265  56 
Engineering and Machinery  350  57 
Software and Computer Services  219  55 
     
     Total Observations  834  168 
 
 
Panel B: Excluded Sampleb 
 
Industry Name  Expensers  Capitalizers 
     
Electronic and Electrical Equipment  191  56 
Engineering and Machinery  219  57 
Software and Computer Services  179  55 
     
     Total Observations  589  168 
 
 
aThe sample consists of U.K. firms who disclosed either a R&D asset or R&D expense in any 
year t=1991-1999, with the following data available on Datastream: industry membership, 
earnings, number of shares outstanding and corporate tax rate (lagged, contemporaneous and the 
subsequent three years), stock price and stock return (contemporaneous annual return and the 
subsequent three-year buy-and-hold return). We also require firms to be in one of the top three 
R&D industries (defined by number of firm-year observations). A firm-year observation is 
defined as a Capitalizer if in that year the firm reported either a non-zero value for the R&D asset 
or a non-zero amount for R&D amortization; otherwise the firm-year observation is classified as 
an Expenser. Industry classifications are based on Datastream Level 4 classifications. 
 
bThe Excluded Sample removes expensers that we believe may not meet the five conditions for 
capitalization. Specifically, we exclude expensers with either a negative RD_VALUE or 
RD_VALUE smaller than the smallest positive RD_VALUE for the capitalizers within the same 
industry-year. RD_VALUE equals the difference between market value of equity and book value 
of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) at fiscal year end, divided by the sum 
of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
  Expensers  Capitalizers  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Share Price  1.86 1.25  1.76 1.04  0.64 0.05 
Market Value  261.09 56.06  330.02 23.57  0.37 0.01 
Sales  263.28 56.98  305.97 39.03  0.52 0.25 
Assets  216.85 40.86  327.20 29.35  0.08 0.30 
Book Value of Equity  81.86 19.88  123.59 10.43  0.03 0.05 
Earnings  14.49 2.78  11.91 0.75  0.59 0.01 
Reported EPSt-1  0.08 0.08  0.09 0.05  0.85 0.01 
Reported EPSt  0.10 0.08  0.01 0.04  0.01 0.01 
Reported EPSt+τ  0.27 0.24  0.00 0.07  0.01 0.01 
R&D Expense  4.52 1.47  8.55 0.39  0.01 0.01 
R&D Asset  - -  7.22 0.60  - - 
Age  38.88 26.60  32.06 18.94  0.01 0.01 
Market-to-Book  3.71 2.25  8.76 2.23  0.01 0.93 
R&D Intensity  0.05 0.03  0.08 0.04  0.01 0.55 
Leverage  1.57 1.03  1.35 1.55  0.71 0.01 
EP Variability  0.03 0.00  0.06 0.03  0.01 0.01 
Beta  0.76 0.77  0.76 0.71  0.97 0.83 
RD_VALUE  22.54 9.21  22.13 6.88  0.95 0.17 
 
 
Panel B:  Variables Used in the Stock Price Informativeness Testb 
 
  Expensers  Capitalizers  Difference 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Returnt  33.51% 15.82%  25.36% 6.74%  0.39 0.07 
Et-1  0.08 0.08  0.08 0.04  0.94 0.01 
Et  0.10 0.08  0.00 0.03  0.01 0.01 
Et+τ  0.27 0.24  0.00 0.07  0.01 0.01 
Returnt+τ  65.35% 12.05%  40.05% 11.62%  0.20 0.08 
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Table 2 - Continued 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
aShare price per share and market value are measured at the end of the fiscal year. Share price is 
reported in pounds sterling; market value, sales, assets, book value of equity, earnings, R&D 
expense and R&D asset are measured in millions of pounds sterling.  Reported EPSt-1, Reported 
EPSt and Reported EPSt+τ are equal to reported earnings divided by number of shares 
outstanding for the lagged year, current year and the sum of the future three years' EPS, 
respectively. Age is the number of years since incorporation. Market-to-Book is market value 
divided by book value (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year 
end. R&D intensity is R&D expenditures divided by total assets (converted to ‘as-if-expense’ for 
the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by book 
value (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. EP 
Variability is earnings variability and is calculated as σ2(Et/Pt-1) using all available data from 
1990-2002 (we require a minimum of three observations per firm to estimate variability), where 
Et is earnings per share in year t and Pt-1 is share price at the start of the fiscal year t. Beta is the 
market model beta calculated using monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year 
end (requiring a minimum of 12 months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE 
All Share Index. RD_VALUE equals the difference between market value of equity and book 
value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) at fiscal year end, divided by the 
sum of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures.   
 
bRt is the annual return measured over the period beginning nine months before the end of the 
fiscal year and ending three months after the fiscal year end in year t. Rt+τ is the buy-and-hold 
return measured over the following three years (measured over months (+3, +39) relative to 
fiscal year end). Et is earnings divided by shares outstanding for fiscal year t; Et-1 and Et+t are 
earnings divided by shares outstanding for fiscal year t-1 and the sum of the future three years' 
EPS, respectively. Earnings per share is as reported for expensers, and adjusted to 'as-if-expense' 
for capitalizers. All earnings per share numbers are reported in pounds sterling.   
 
cThe Difference column reports the significance levels for F-tests (Wilcoxon tests) comparing 
the pooled sample mean (median) for the difference between expensers and capitalizers. 
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Table 3 
RD_VALUE Correlationa 
 
 
Industry Name ROE (Raw) ROE (Adj) Rev Gwth 
    
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 0.421 0.415 0.300 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Engineering and Machinery 0.521 0.517 0.169 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Software and Computer Services 0.308 0.295 0.218 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
     Full Sample 0.418 0.411 0.190 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
 
aThis table reports the spearman correlation between RD_VALUE and three standard measures 
of success for each industry. RD_VALUE equals the difference between market value of equity 
and book value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) at fiscal year end, 
divided by the sum of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures. ROE (Raw) 
equals earnings divided by book value measured at fiscal year end; ROE (Adj) equals earnings 
divided by book value (both converted to 'as-if-expense' for capitalizers) measured at fiscal year 
end. Rev Gwth equals average revenue growth over the following three years from fiscal year 
end.  Probability values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of the Decision to Capitalize Development Expendituresa 
 
Panel A:  Full Sampleb 
 
  ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING  SOFTWARE 
  Coefficient Significance  Coefficient Significance  Coefficient Significance
          
Intercept  -2.69 0.01  -0.63 0.18  -2.18 0.01 
          
EARN_VAR  2.47 0.01  -0.20 0.59  2.41 0.01 
EARN_SIGN  0.32 0.20  -0.52 0.02  -0.29 0.20 
SIZE  -0.25 0.56  -1.29 0.01  1.43 0.01 
M/B  3.16 0.01  0.46 0.35  0.12 0.79 
RD_VALUE  -2.03 0.01  0.30 0.53  -0.23 0.64 
RDINT  -1.50 0.01  -0.41 0.23  0.27 0.51 
BETA  0.63 0.08  0.97 0.01  -1.28 0.01 
          
% Correctly Classified  72.27%   67.57%   71.90%  
 
 
 
Panel B: Excluded Samplec 
 
  ELECTRICAL  ENGINEERING  SOFTWARE 
  Coefficient Significance  Coefficient Significance  Coefficient Significance
          
Intercept  -1.06 0.11  1.58 0.01  -1.59 0.01 
          
EARN_VAR  2.23 0.01  -0.54 0.21  2.55 0.01 
EARN_SIGN  0.20 0.47  -0.57 0.05  -0.23 0.33 
SIZE  -0.40 0.38  -1.65 0.01  1.16 0.01 
M/B  2.30 0.01  0.56 0.28  0.18 0.68 
RD_VALUE  -2.78 0.01  -1.95 0.01  -0.83 0.11 
RDINT  -2.31 0.01  -1.44 0.01  0.08 0.87 
BETA  0.63 0.11  0.88 0.04  -1.48 0.01 
          
% Correctly Classified  77.64%   72.83%   76.50%  
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Table 4 - Continued 
Determinants of the Decision to Capitalize Development Expendituresa 
 
aThis table reports the coefficient estimates and significance levels from estimating the following 
Probit model: 
 
CAPit = β0 + β1EARN_VARit + β2EARN_SIGNit + β3SIZEit + β4M/Bit   
 + β5RDINTit + β6BETAit + β7RD_VALUEit + εit 
 
CAPit = indicator variable equal to one if firm i capitalizes development expenditures in year t, 
zero otherwise. EARN_VARit = percentile ranking of firm i's earnings variance within each 
firm's industry. Earnings variance is calculated as the variance of the firm's earnings per share 
deflated by share price at the start of the fiscal year, over 1990-2002 (earnings per share is 
adjusted to be 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers). EARN_SIGNit = indicator variable equal to 
one if Eit is positive, zero otherwise. SIZEit = percentile ranking of firm i's market value 
(measured at fiscal year end) within each firm's industry-year. M/Bit = percentile ranking of firm 
i's market-to-book within each firm's industry-year. Market-to-Book is market value divided by 
book value (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end.  
RDINTit = percentile ranking of firm i's R&D intensity within each firm's industry-year. R&D 
intensity is R&D expenditures divided by total assets (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the 
capitalizers) measured at fiscal year end. BETAit = percentile ranking of firm i's beta within each 
firm's industry-year. Beta is the market model beta calculated using monthly returns ending in 
the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 months and maximum of 60 
months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index. RD_VALUEit = percentile ranking of firm i's 
RD_VALUE within each firm's industry-year; RD_VALUE equals the difference between 
market value of equity and book value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) 
at fiscal year end, divided by the sum of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures.  
εit = residual term for firm i in year t. % Correctly Classified reports the percentage of 
observations we define as correctly classified; an expenser (capitalizer) firm-year observation is 
correctly classified when the fitted probability is less than (greater than) the ratio of capitalizers 
to expensers in each industry. 
 
bThe Full Sample column uses all firm-year observations. 
 
cThe Excluded Sample removes expensers that we believe may not meet the five conditions for 
capitalization. Specifically, we exclude expensers with either a negative RD_VALUE or 
RD_VALUE smaller than the smallest positive RD_VALUE for the capitalizers within the same 
industry-year. RD_VALUE equals the difference between market value of equity and book value 
of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) at fiscal year end, divided by the sum 
of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures. 
 
Table 5 
Informativeness of Stock Pricesa 
 
                                      Sample 
Explanatory Variable 
Full Sampleb 
  
Excluded Samplec 
  
Et-1 -0.29 -0.37 
  (-2.82) (-2.32) 
Et 1.10 1.84 
  (6.61) (7.96) 
Et+τ 0.35 0.39 
  (8.29) (5.49) 
Rt+τ -0.07 -0.07 
  (-5.20) (-4.12) 
CAPt -0.27 -0.09 
  (-1.94) (-0.59) 
CAPt*Et-1 -0.72 -0.67 
  (-2.40) (-2.14) 
CAPt*Et 0.27 -0.52 
  (0.55) (-1.74) 
CAPt*Et+τ 0.25 0.18 
  (2.05) (1.76) 
CAPt*Rt+τ -0.10 -0.09 
  (-2.46) (-2.19) 
MILLSt -0.04 0.01 
  (-1.37) (0.12) 
MILLSt*CAPt 0.17 0.07 
  (1.86) (0.64) 
 
aThis table reports the average coefficient and z-statistic (in parentheses) from estimating the 
informativeness of accounting information for expensers and capitalizers:  
 
Rt = α0 + Φ1Et-1 + Φ2Et + Φ3Et+τ + Φ4Rt+τ + Φ5CAPt + Φ6CAPt*Et-1 + Φ7CAPt*Et   
       + Φ8CAPt*Et+τ + Φ9CAPt*Rt+τ + Φ10MILLSt + Φ11MILLSt*CAPt + μt  
 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. The Z-statistic tests whether the mean t-statistic equals zero 
and equals ∑
=
−
N
j
jjj kktN
1
)2/(//1  where tj is the t-statistic for industry j, kj is the degrees of 
freedom for industry j, and N is the number of industries. The 5% (1%) significance levels for Z 
is 1.645 (1.96). 
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Table 5 - Continued 
Informativeness of Stock Pricesa 
 
bThe Full Sample column uses all firm-year observations. 
 
cThe Excluded Sample removes expensers that we believe may not meet the five conditions for 
capitalization. Specifically, we exclude expensers with either a negative RD_VALUE or 
RD_VALUE smaller than the smallest positive RD_VALUE for the capitalizers within the same 
industry-year.  RD_VALUE equals the difference between market value of equity and book 
value of equity (converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers) at fiscal year end, divided by the 
sum of the firm's current and lagged annual R&D expenditures. 
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Notes 
 
1 SSAP #13 allows for the capitalization of development expenditures provided that they meet five conditions 
(which generally requires that management is satisfied that the expenditures go towards creating a commercially 
viable product / service). Research expenditures must be expensed in the period incurred. See section 4 for more 
detail on SSAP # 13. 
 
2 Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) group the U.K., U.S., Australia, and Canada as major common-law countries. 
 
3 Tobin (1982) refers to improvement in efficiency of resource allocation as functional efficiency. Durnev, et al. 
(2003) discuss the link between informational efficiency and functional efficiency. 
 
4 As Aboody and Lev explain, the relation between the book value of capitalized software R&D and future earnings 
is somewhat mechanical, because capitalization can take place only after feasibility is determined. Thus, since only 
successful projects get capitalized, greater capitalized costs mean higher future earnings. 
 
5 We do not mean to imply that increasing the amount of information is necessarily the reason that firms capitalize. 
However, increased information may still be a consequence of the choice. 
 
6 We show only one future year for ease of exposition. Liu and Thomas (2000) estimate a model similar to (1) using 
analysts forecasts as proxies for market expectations. We use actual future earnings as the regressors and not 
analysts’ forecasts, because we want to know how much information about future earnings is reflected in current 
returns (i.e., how close future earnings realizations are to the unobservable expectations implicit in stock prices). 
 
7 Contemporaneous ERC is often estimated as the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged earnings, b0 + b1. 
 
8 Other recent papers using the informativeness measure are Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), Ayres and 
Freeman (2001), Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002), and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004).  
 
9 There are a number of reasons why management may chose not to capitalize development expenditures which 
meet the five criteria outlined in SSAP #13. First, it may be costly to deviate from analyst preferences (AIMR, 
1994).  Second, managers may be concerned about the quality of current and future earnings (Freeburn, 1998). 
Finally, there are measurement and record keeping costs associated with capitalizing development expenditures 
(Nixon and Lonnie, 1990). 
 
10 For example, for firms in the mining industry, Datastream often reports a positive amount for the firm's R&D 
asset; however, upon examination it is apparent that the amount reported relates to an exploration asset, not R&D.  
Similarly, for many firms in the Oil and Gas industry, the R&D asset relates to exploration and development.  
 
11 We measure leverage as total debt divided by book value of equity (converted to ‘as-if-expense’ for capitalizers) 
R&D intensity is measured as the total amount expended on R&D (equal to R&D expense for the expensers and 
R&D expense plus the amount added to the R&D asset for the capitalizers) divided by total assets (converted to an 
'as-if-expense' basis for the capitalizers). We measure the market-to-book ratio as the market value of equity divided 
by book value of equity, converted to 'as-if-expense' for the capitalizers. We measure beta as the market model beta 
calculated using monthly returns ending in the month of the firm's fiscal year end (requiring a minimum of 12 
months and maximum of 60 months of returns) and the FTSE All Share Index. 
 
12 Pro-forma (or 'as-if-expense') earnings are the earnings that would have been reported had the firm followed a 
policy of fully expensing R&D expenditures. We construct capitalizers’ pro-forma earnings by subtracting the 
excess (or adding the deficit) after-tax amount of development costs capitalized minus amortization expense, from 
reported net income. Even if capitalizers do not report the amount of development costs capitalized, we can compute 
the pro-forma operating profit, because the difference between the amount capitalized and the amortization expense 
equals the change in the reported R&D asset balance. 
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13 For example, Lang (1991) and Freeman (1987) find that young firms and small firms, respectively, have earnings 
that are more variable and have a lower association with stock returns.  
 
14 Another way to deal with selection bias is to examine the change in FERC for firms that switch methods, so that 
each firm acts as its own control. We did not do this, because there are only 25 switchers (an average of 8 per 
industry), so the sample size is small. Moreover, with only a nine year sample period, either the pre or post switch 
period (or both) is too short to reliably estimate FERC. We re-estimated our regressions after eliminating switchers. 
The results, not shown in the interest of brevity, are very similar to our main results.  
 
15 Skinner uses the term “investment opportunity set” (IOS) to capture firm type. Similar to us, he uses R&D 
intensity and q (which is related to the M/B ratio) as proxies for IOS.  
 
16 We also calculated the earnings variance as σ2(ΔEPSt/Pt-1), with very similar results.  
 
17 As a robustness test we also included firm age (defined as the number of years since incorporation) and sales 
growth (defined as current sales minus lagged sales all divided by lagged sales) in our Probit model. Neither variable 
was significant in explaining the capitalization choice in any of our three industries. For brevity, we do not report 
these results. 
 
18 We use two years of R&D expenditures in the denominator to avoid undue influence from the current year. We do 
not use more than two years since prior to 1990 the disclosure of R&D expense was voluntary, and to use more 
years eliminates too many observations.   
 
19 Since successful firms can choose to expense, we have no expectation about firms with high RD_VALUEs. As we 
discuss in Section 5.3, the most successful firms do in fact choose to expense. 
 
20 Our model is similar to Aboody and Lev’s (1998), who use size, profitability, R&D intensity, beta, and leverage 
as explanatory variables. As a robustness test, we re-estimated the model adding leverage, and our results were 
virtually unchanged. In addition, although we suggest in Section I that earnings-based bonus plans may provide an 
incentive for managers to manipulate earnings for their own benefit, we are unable to control for this factor in our 
analysis. Information pertaining to the composition of bonus plans is unavailable for our entire time-series. Finally, 
in footnote 9 we suggest that there are costs associated with capitalization; however, we are unable to accurately 
measure these costs and therefore, we cannot include them in our model. 
 
21 Based on the distribution of expensers and capitalizers, we define an expenser (capitalizer) firm-year observation 
as correctly classified when the fitted probability is less than (greater than) the ratio of capitalizers to expensers in 
each industry. 
 
22 We also used returns measured over months (-12, 0) relative to the fiscal year end. Very similar results are found. 
To remove extreme observations, we windsorize Rt, Et, Et-1, Et+τ, and Rt+τ at the top / bottom 1%, and we remove 
observations with studentized residuals greater than two. 
 
23 The Z statistics assume that the industry regressions are independent. However, since the regressions are all 
estimated over the same time period, they might not be independent. To check our independence assumption, we 
estimate the regressions with fixed time effects, and the results are very similar. The Z statistic also assumes that the 
coefficients’ standard errors are unbiased. This is a reasonable assumption, since the regressions are run by industry. 
In effect, all observations are relative to their industry mean, as in an industry index model, so that common industry 
effects are removed (Bernard, 1987). Results for the individual industries are available from the authors on request. 
 
24 Although the coefficients of the Mills ratios are insignificant, we include them to make the results of the two 
samples comparable. 
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